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41. Introduction
This study focuses on effects of fiscal policy on business cycles in Norway over a period of 21 years.
In many countries, Norway included, fiscal policy has been actively used in order to reduce business
cycles. The main question we adress is to what extent deviations from trend in fiscal policy variables
have helped reduce cyclical swings in macroeconomic variables during 1973-93. Our results suggest a
certain, however limited stabilization effect.
Recent macroeconomic research has made the definition of business cycles as deviation from trend
more problematic than was previously realized. The possibility of describing GDP and other macro-
economic aggregates as governed by unit root processes implies that the distinction between trend and
cycles may vanish. At the same time periods of expansion and contraction of overall economic
activity is still an important aspect of modern market economies. The debate over stabilisation policy
implies that the concept of business cycles is very much alive. Recognizing the presence of different
views on this topic, we conduct our analysis by defining trends in macroeconomic variables and
define deviations from these trends as cyclical movements.
The Keynesian revolution triggered a view that it is possible by means of active policy to stabilize the
movements in output and other important macroeconomic variables. In Norway this attitude has had
strong support among most policy-makers of different political colours since World War II. However,
along with the international development, the belief in fine tuning has been reduced also in Norway,
though probably to a lesser extent than in many other countries. A study of the full role of stabili-
zation policy and of government in a wider sense, is beyond our scope. We only analyse the effects of
certain changes in the use of fiscal policy instruments, in a way that we define below. This means that
other areas of stabilization policy, such as monetary, credit and exchange rate policy and income
policy are not included in our analysis. The development of the welfare state and the increased rela-
tive size of the government sector has implied that the role of automatic stabilizers in the economy has
increased, which has had important effects on how the economy responds to external shocks (e.g. oil
price shocks and world market demand shocks). On the other hand ,increased openness has reduced
the multiplier effects of fiscal policy. A lower multiplier effects also results from the fact that the
economy in 1993 (contrary to the early 1970s) contained a large resource-based sector (oil and gas)
that is little responsive to traditional demand management, but very price-sensitive. Financial
deregulation has changed the response of the private sector to fiscal policy changes. The macro-
econometric model for the Norwegian economy - we have used - KVARTS of Statistics Norway,
treats all these developments as given and are not a part of this analysis1.
The macroeconometric model is used to simulate effects of deviations from smooth trajectories for
fiscal policy variables. The effects are evaluated in light of the cyclical stance of the economy, to see
whether policy has been procyclical or countercyclical. Chapter 2 outlines the methodology used,
while chapter 3 gives a brief overview of business cycles and fiscal policy in Norway. Chapter 4 gives
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 Financial deregulation is taken account of by dummy variables in the consumption function, the housing price, housing
investment and interest rate equations. After deregulation of financial markets the GDP multiplier was slightly increased, cf.
Hove and Eika (1994).
5a closer description of the developments in policy instruments while the main results are reported in
chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes.
2. Methodology
Stabilisation policy takes place through a host of policy instruments, each having potentially different
effects on the economy. Policy is executed through fiscal policy and monetary policy, as well as
exchange rate policy. When trying to answer the question whether the authorities have succeeded in
stabilizing output and employment (or any other interesting variable) one should in principle take
account of all policy instruments. We have a more modest goal when we ask the question whether the
use of a sub-set of policy instruments - which we label fiscal policy - actually has reduced or increased
the deviations from trend in certain macroeconomic aggregates during 1973-93. We analyse the effects
of the use of these instruments, given the historical development of the policy instruments within the
realms of monetary and exchange rate policy. It is easy to find examples where this may not be a good
description of historical events. For example, one might argue that if one had pursued a more con-
tractionary policy in the booming years of 1984-85, the devaluation of the krone by 10 per cent in the
wake of the oil price fall in 1986 could have been smaller or perhaps not necessary. Still, it is of interest
to analyse the partial effects of certain policy instruments on major macroeconomic variables.
Indicators of fiscal stance have been increasingly popular, and are now being published both by
national authorities (mostly finance ministries) and by OECD. Indicators of fiscal stance measure
budget balances corrected for changes in expenditures and revenues that can be attributed to the fact
that the economy deviates from a neutral cyclical situation. As such corrections are very difficult to
make, in Norway the Ministry of Finance only publishes the annual changes - not the level - of this
budget indicator. This underlines the short term nature of such indicators. As is recognised, budget
indicators measure the initial demand effect of the budget, but does not account for the fact that 1
krone of increased government expenditure (or 1 krone reduced revenues) have very different effects
on the economy depending on what fiscal instruments are actually being used. Such compositional
effects can only be studied in a disaggregated economic analysis. The KVARTS model is suitable in
this respect, since it specifies a disaggregated set of policy instruments.
Franz (1990) has undertaken an analysis of fiscal policy in Germany using estimated relationships in
stead of a macroeconometric model. As he used the official budget indicator of fiscal stance as the
only indicator of fiscal policy, his analysis does not account for effects of using different policy
instruments.
A model-based analysis slightly different from the present one, involving shocks from fiscal policy is
Fair (1988). He utilized the Fair model of the US to analyse effects of stochastic shocks in all econo-
metric equations and in estimated processes for exogenous variable. He used stochastic simulations to
decompose the variance in GDP on these exogenous shocks, without directly trying to answer whether
policy actually made GDP more or less volatile. It is still of interest to contrast his procedure for
estimating processes for exogenous variables with our trending procedure. Fair estimated univariate
6processes for the policy variables for the whole sample and undertook stochastic simulations of
shocks to these processes. As he used the whole sample in estimating the processes, the secular parts
of policy processes (trends) were influenced by the future development in this analysis as well. In this
way his procedure resembles the one used in our analysis. The main difference is that we use
deterministic simulations and use the HP filter to generate trends.
Model-based analyses may to a larger extent take account of the fact that different instruments may
affect the economy differently, though the initial budget effects may be identical. In such analyses the
common procedure is to simulate the effects of policy instruments' deviations from what has been
defined as a "neutral" policy, cf. e.g. . Artis et al. (1984) and Bowitz et al. (1993) for applications on
UK and Norway. In these analyses neutral policy for a variable was defined e.g. as a certain growth
rate for government expenditures, and this growth rate was set equal to average growth over a period
before the start of the analysis. A neutral policy usually was defined as unchanged aggregate tax rates
relative to the starting year. No attempt was made to see whether this development was sustainable in
the long run. This is justified by the short run nature of these analyses (up to 5 years). It is also
possible to measure policy effects as deviations from explicit policy rules, as in e.g. Wallis and
Whitley (1992), a procedure we have not followed in our study.
In analysing effects of policy over a relatively short period, it is not unreasonable to define neutral
policy by constant growth rates. However, when the period of analysis becomes longer, such
simplistic assumptions become less reasonable. During our period of study, government consumption
has risen faster than GDP, and the share of transfers to GDP has risen significantly. In addition there
seems to have been changes in the underlying growth rates for many policy variables during the
period 1973-1993. This has motivated us to define trends in the instruments and interpret deviations
from these trends as the effects of fiscal policy. However, as will be seen later, neither this approach
is without problems.
There are several factors underlying the observed long term trajectories in policy instruments. First,
large movements in instruments in short run stabilisation policy may prove to have turned into what
appear as long-term trends, if the instruments do not return to their starting values or original trends
after e.g. a countercyclical fiscal expansion. It has been argued that a factor behind the increasing role
of government consumption has been continuous increases in government consumption as part of
Keynesian countercyclical policy associated with an inability to reduce government consumption after
the end of a recession, and that the net result has been an (unintended) increase in the government
consumption/GDP ratio. Second, even an aim of a constant government consumption/GDP ratio may
result in a slowdown in the underlying growth of government consumption if GDP growth declines.
And a slowdown in GDP growth was actually what happened in OECD and also in Norway in (parts
of ) the 1980s. Third, long run structural/political/- economic factors may have caused the increased
government consumption/GDP ratio, such as political attitudes in favour of increased government
control over the economy, high income elasticities for government produced goods combined with a
choice that certain goods and services (health services etc. ) mainly should be produced by the
government. Fourth, changing political and ideological attitudes have obviously influenced the
7development of government consumption and taxes. The conservative and centre-right governments
of the early 1980s in Norway had as a specific goal to reduce the government's role. And the Social
democratic governments of the late 1980s and early 1990s certainly were less government-friendly
than were the governments from the same party in the 1970s. Fifth, the long run trajectories for the
development of fiscal policy variables in Norway have been heavily influenced by the prospects for
and later actual realizations of large petroleum revenues. The resource discoveries in the early 1970s
followed by the oil price rise of OPEC 1, raised the permanent income of Norway. These revenues
were channelled into the rest of the economy through government budgets (via oil taxes), and surely
contributed to increased expenditures in some areas, and reduced taxes for the non-oil sectors in some
areas. It is however not our purpose here to analyse what would Norway looked like without the oil
sector, neither what would have been the effects of other ways of channelling the oil revenues into the
economy.
To sum up: There have been long run observed trends in all policy instruments, and for many of these
the trends appear to change slowly. These developments have been governed by a multitude of factors
summarized above. The actual movements in policy instruments have however not been smooth. In
some periods increases have been large and in others the changes in the instruments have been small.
We want to analyse the effects of the deviations from a smooth development of the instruments. The
results will depend on how the smooth development is defined. Although in most cases we utilise a
formal procedure for detrending, the credibility of our analysis depends on whether the trend is
judged plausible or not by the reader. We report the actual development and the smooth trajectory for
all instruments.
Interpreting business cycles as fluctuations in the overall level of economic activity, different parts of
the economy may have different fluctuations. In business cycle analysis, GDP is often used as an
aggregate indicator for the business cycle. In Norway, however, there are reasons to deviate from this
choice. Our choice has been to use Mainland GDP (GDP exclusive petroleum extraction and ocean
transport) as the reference indicator. The exclusion of the petroleum sector is done mainly because the
rapid growth of this sector has been governed by other forces than the factors determining the
development in the rest of the economy. Value added in the sector mainly consists of the extraction of
crude oil and natural gas and is in the short run determined by the size of the sector (number of plat-
forms etc.) and of how much oil and gas that eventually emerge in the developed oil and gas fields.
Oil prices and discoveries of resources have been the main factors behind the growth of the petroleum
sector. The development of that sector should thus to a large extent be seen as external to the develop-
ment in the rest of the economy. The exclusion of ocean transport from our reference indicator is done
because the activity in this sector takes place outside Norway and is mainly driven by factors deter-
mining trade between third countries.
One might have gone even further by analysing only the development of the private sector of the
mainland economy. If one sees the private sector as the source of volatility and want to study to what
extent fiscal policy has succeeded in stabilising output in that part of the economy, that would have
been warranted. However, if we can not exclude the possibility that government is not particularly
8directed at stabilizing the private sector output, but rather overall activity, it is relevant to include the
government sector in the reference indicator.
As indicated above, the discrimination between trend and cycle is not a resolved issue, both regarding
whether it actually is justified to define a trend and cycle at all, and if this is the case, what part of the
series' development is trend and what part is cycle. According to Bjørnland (1995) most macroeconomic
time series in Norway may be described as unit root processes, which indicates that it is not meaningful
to split the development in the series into trend and cycle. However, the last word in this matter is hardly
said, and we proceed under the assumption that the distinction is meaningful. Numerous procedures for
de-trending are possible (an overview is given in Bjørnland (1995)). We have chosen to define the trend
as the outcome of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. In a few cases this procedure yields a smooth policy
that we found unreasonable, where we have defined smooth policy in different ways.
The data used are seasonally adjusted quarterly national accounts data2. In graphs, a centred weighted
average over 4 quarters of the seasonally adjusted series is used in order to facilitate visual inspection
of the results (see appendix 1 for details). The macroeconometric model KVARTS is estimated and
simulated on seasonally unadjusted data. Consequently the simulation results are also seasonally
adjusted and smoothed.
It is important to recognize that the calculations of the trend take account of the whole development of
the series. Thus, the trend in 1973 for e.g. government consumption takes account on the fact that the
level was relatively high in the 1980s, which may have been a consequence of the oil revenues
accruing in this period. The trends are both forward- and backward-looking. This might imply too
much rationality for policy-makers. It implies full knowledge of future oil revenues and the future
choice of policy mix to inject these revenues into the economy. However, there has been a significant
element of forward-looking behaviour in policy-making, both with regard to future domestic and
foreign economic growth and with regard to oil revenues. Already in 1974, a parliamentary report
drew a picture of the rest of the decade which turned out to contain a fairly accurate estimate of
government petroleum revenues 5-7 years ahead (Ministry of Finance (1974)).
It turned out that the definition of trends using the HP filter was sensitive to the "window" utilized in
the analysis. By only only utilizing data from 1973 to 1993, data values in the first and last years
seemed to exert a large influence of the resulting trends from the filter. In order to reduce this depen-
dency, we have utilized historical data back to 1967. At the end of the period of analysis, it is very
difficult to se from the data whether the economy will recover even more after 1993, or not. This has
potentially large consequences for the estimated depth of the downturn in the early 1990s. The proce-
dure here has consisted of using historical data for 1994 and 1995. In addition, we think that forecasts
for the future also contain information that is relevant to include in the trends. We thus have linked
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 In 1995, a main revision of the Norwegian national accounts was undertaken. This analysis is made on the pre-revision
figures, since sufficiently long historical time series have not been available. As the revisions mainly affected levels rather
than changes, this is likely to have only small effects on the description of Norewgian business cycles.
9the historical series with a model simulation to 2010 before the trends are estimated3. This will further
reduce the problem of end-point dependency.
A desirable property of the smooth policy is that it be sustainable. The definition of smooth policy
just as a smoothed trajectory through the historical development of the policy variables makes the
fulfilment of this property likely. Still, large budget deficits in the latest years of the period of ana-
lysis, might render fiscal policy unsustainable. The linking of the historical data with a model-based
simulation that ensures fiscal balance until 2010, further ensures that fiscal policy is sustainable both
under actual and under the smooth policy.
Our approach has consisted of the following elements. The starting point of the analysis is a full
dynamic historical model simulation using the KVARTS model, which exactly reproduces the historical
development according to quarterly national accounts data for 1973-1993. This is accomplished by
letting all exogenous variables (policy instruments and other exogenous variables) attain their historical
values. In addition, all econometric error terms are set equal to their historical values4. The next step was
to construct a simulation with a smooth trajectory for the policy instruments. The simulated policy
effects are measured as the difference between the historical simulation and the smooth policy simu-
lation. Dynamic simulation is used since this allows the effects of the shocks to evolve over time.
The results are measured as Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) and Mean Absolute Percentage Devi-
ation (MAPD), where the deviation is defined as the difference between the historical value/simulated
value and the trend. MAD/MAPD are reported for the sub-periods 1973-1982 and 1983-1993 and the
whole period 1973-1993. If the actual policy was countercyclical, MAD/MAPD is larger in the simu-
lation with smooth policy than in the simulation with the historical trajectories for policy variables,
and vice versa in the case of a procyclical policy. As we look upon several policy instruments, we can
assess which instruments contributed most to stabilizing GDP and which contributed least (or might
even strengthen the cycles in GDP). In graphs, the deviations from trend (levels and per cent) are
reported.
The procedure emphazises level effects in the definition of deviations from smooth policy. This may
imply that even if e.g. government consumption grows with a high rate in a given year, it may still be
below trend if the government consumption growth rates in the previous years were particularly low.
In such a situation, many observers would say that policies were expansionary. According to a strict
interpretation of our definition, there would be a negative shock to government consumption, and the
model would surely predict a negative effect on GDP(at least in the short run). As we are concen-
trating on level effects on GDP, this distinction between interpretations should be borne in mind when
looking at the results. In the description of the historical business cycles, we will use the term
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 The simulation was made by using Statistics Norway's macroeconomic model MODAG. The main properties of the
simulation are described in appendix 2 in Bowitz et al. (1994).
4
 The model is able to reproduce the main development of the historical data in a full dynamic simulation from 1973Q1 to
1993Q4 when all econometric error terms are set to zero, cf. Hove and Eika (1994). However, in this policy analysis, we
prefer to work with a model simulation which exactly reproduces the historical data.
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"contractionary" and "expansionary" with a view to growth rates in government demand and changes
in tax rates, thus emphazising change effects.
The limitations of the study must be acknowledged. First, all results depend on the premise that our
model is a good replication of the economy. One necessary condition is that the model actually is able
to reproduce the main developments of the macroeconomic variables in question. This is shown in
Hove and Eika (1994). But still, the results hinge upon an unproved (which is impossible) premise
that the model is "correct". The Lucas critique deals with autonomy regarding changes in policy
regime. One important regime change, the liberalisation of domestic credit markets, has been accoun-
ted in the econometric equations in question. In the consumption function and housing investment
equations current income plays a lesser role after deregulation than before, at the expense of wealth
effects. And we surely want to simulate the economic effects of a change in policy regime.
Second, we do not address the feasibility of the assumed alternative development. Technical/-
economic feasibility regards if it be possible in the government administrative system to smooth
employment decisions or investment decisions to obtain our assumed smooth trajectories. Problems
along these lines can be attributed to increasing or decreasing the capacity of the education system or
the health system. Political obstacles regarding the possibilities of obtaining parliamentary support for
such a policy is also disregarded. We just ask what would have been the effects of a smooth policy,
assumed it would have been feasible.
3. Norwegian business cycles and fiscal policy 1973-1993
Our chosen reference indicator for the activity level is GDP mainland. Figure 1 and 2 show the results
for this variable. Figure 3 below shows the unemployment rate, the current account and general
government balance. Unemployment appears not to be characterised by a smooth trend at all, rather a
break as unemployment rose in the late 1980s. The current account and government balance has been
more volatile, with the former displaying the largest volatility. Below we will limit ourselves to a
general description of the business cycles utilizing the reference indicator, GDP mainland. A more
detailed description of the development of economic policy and macroeconomic fluctuations in
Norway is given in e.g. Fagerberg et al. (1992).
The choice of the smoothness parameter λ in the HP filter is crucial in determining the trend. Figure 1
shows GDP mainland and trends using three different values of λ; the internationally common value
of λ = 1600, an intermediate value of 16000 and a high value of 100000. The per cent deviations from
these trends are shown in figure 2. A value of 100000 generates a trend that changes relatively little
over time, whereas a value of 1600 generates a trend that to a considerable extent follows movements
up and down in activity in the 1980s and 1990s.
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In Norway, the fluctuations in GDP mainland were small and unemployment was very low by
international standards in the 1970s, while the period was characterized by strong economic growth.
Slower growth occurred in the beginning of the 1980s partly as a consequence of the international
recession following OPEC II. A period of unprecedented growth then followed from 1984 to 1986,
after the deregulation of domestic financial markets. The upturn was brought to a halt by the falling
oil prices in 1985/86, which threatened the external balance, and the economy went into a recession
that had not ended until the end of our period of analysis (though GDP mainland was back on trend
with a λ-value of 1600). The determination of the trend differs significantly between the three λ
values, although the peaks and troughs occur approximately at the same time. However, the sizes of
the up- and downturns still differ substantially, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. Our view is that a
value of 1600 implies that too much of the short run movements in the series are reflected in the trend
and thus underestimate the deviations from trend. This value is thus easily dismissed for our purpose.
The differences between λ = 16000 and λ = 100 000 are smaller, though significant after 1990. Our
choice is to use the value of 100 000, which implies a relatively rigid trend. Although this choice can
be discussed, the choice should have little bearing on the results whether policy has been procyclical
or countercyclical, since the qualitative picture is largely the same for these two values. Our choice of
100 000 is partly motivated by a view that the recession in 1989-93 was deeper than the one in 1982-
83 using also other indicators such as unemployment. The results from using a λ-value of 100 000 is
most in accordance with this view.
According to all definitions of the trend, GDP mainland was above trend most of the 1970s. The
1970s thus appear more or less as a period of continuos expansion. However, as unemployment on
average was very low in Norway this period, it is not unreasonable to characterize the whole period
more or less as a period with GDP mainland above trend.
Still, we can identify periods of change in the differences between trend and cycle in the 1970s,
according to all three trend definitions. Although the size of the difference varies according to the
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definitions of trend, the general picture regarding the movements are very similar. The differences in
GDP from trend were small, in the magnitude 1-2 per cent in the 1970s. Upturns appeared in early
1975, in 1976-77 and in 1979. In the 1980s, GDP mainland became more volatile. Average growth
was lower in the 1980s than in the 1970s. The Norwegian economy was below trend in the first half
of the 1980s followed by an unprecedented upturn in the mid-1980s after the deregulation of financial
markets. A clear picture of downturn after 1987 and a subsequent recovery is evident according to all
definitions of trend.
The overall aim of policy in Norway was traditionally to keep capacity utilisation high and unem-
ployment low by means of a combination of a fiscal policy which implied surpluses on the govern-
ment balance, income policy - and before the liberalisation of credit markets in the early 1980s -
rationing of cheap credit. In Norway, more caution has often been attached to the current account than to
the government balance. The increasing petroleum revenues have been channelled into the economy via
oil taxes and direct government participation in the petroleum sector. These revenues have constituted an
important contribution to Norway's disposable income and the general government financial balance.
With newly discovered petroleum resources, OPEC I resulted in rising expectations of future revenues in
Norway. This caused booms both in private and public spending as well as an investment boom. In the
OECD countries, however, OPEC I caused a severe slowdown of economic growth in 1974 and 1975.
The Norwegian government attempted at pursuing a "bridge" policy over what was at first believed to
be a temporary international downturn. Unprecedented high growth rates in government consumption
in 1975-76 were a part of this policy. Increases in industrial assistance for export-oriented manufacturing
industry was also prevalent. Fuelled by income expectations, the domestic economy went into a boom
which resulted in a large loss of cost-competitiveness and worsening of the current account. When it
became clear that the international economy was not recovering, a policy of halting the growth in
domestic demand was imposed by late 1977. A more restrictive credit policy, a currency devaluation and
a wage and price freeze were the instruments used. Fiscal policy also played a part of this austerity
programme, but not in the initial phase. Growth rates for government consumption and investment seen
together was reduced from nearly 6 per cent in 1978 to around 1.5 per cent in 1979.
Government net lending was reduced partly as a consequence of the expansionary bridging policy in
1975-1978. This, and more important, the increased current account deficit in this period were the
main motivations for abandoning this policy in late 1977. The current account deficit, which increased
from 2 per cent of GDP in 1973 to 15.5 per cent in 1977 was severely affected by imported deliveries
of investment goods for building the capacity in the petroleum sector.
As policy was eased in 1980, growth in government demand rose again, fuelled by another increase in
expectations of future petroleum revenues in Norway caused by OPEC II. However, the oil price rise
produced another cyclical downturn for Norway's trading partners. In 1981-1982 the international
recession fed into the Norwegian economy. Fiscal policy at the time did not seem to be actively used
to counteract this impulse, although reductions in household taxes were implemented as a part of the
newly elected conservative (later: centre-right) government programme; at the same time growth in
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government consumption was reduced. In this
period unemployment rose and GDP fell below
trend. The largest cyclical upturn since World
War II then followed during 1984-86, following
the liberalisation of domestic financial markets.
By 1986, GDP mainland had risen to nearly 6 per
cent above trend. Unemployment fell sharply and
stayed low even longer due to adjustment lags
and the shortening of the normal working week
from 1987 (negotiated at the peak of the business
cycle early 1986). Increases in petroleum
revenues were the main factors behind the large
surpluses on the government balance and the
current account in the first part of the 1980s.
Exclusive these revenues, both these balances
were negative.
The collapse of international oil prices in 1985/86 hit the Norwegian economy hard, and the current
account was early in 1986 forecasted to go into deficit, and uncertainty about the authorities' ability to
maintain the fixed exchange rate was mounting. The government surplus was also reduced, though
still positive. With a still booming domestic economy, a policy contraction was necessary. The
coalition parties could not agree on the policy change and was succeeded by a new labour government
from April 1986, which implemented policy changes. The Norwegian krone was once again devalued
(May) and fiscal policy was tightened. This policy and the ending of the expansionary effects from
domestic credit deregulation, sent the economy into a slump with rapidly rising unemployment in
1988 and 19895. As the increases in unemployment became clear, a traditional Keynesian
expansionary policy of unprecedented size (according to the Ministry of Finance's budget indicator)
was undertaken, weakening the government's finances further. Despite this, GDP mainland was below
trend both in 1991 and 1992, while aproaching trend somewhat in 1993. Unemployment effects
seemed to appear more slowly than the effects on output, and unemployment first started to decline
after 1993.
4. Definitions of policy shocks
Fiscal policy is executed through a detailed set individual decisions of parts of the government
budgets. A model-based analysis can only account for aggregate effects. However, our model is more
disaggregated than many other macroeconometric models, and we utilize the disaggregated model
structure in our analysis. Thus, we have as a general rule defined smooth policy and constructed
historical trends at the most detailed level possible.
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 Other factors such as demand impulses from the petroleum sector were also significant, cf. Cappelen and Eika (1996).
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In Norway, government activity is decided at two levels - the central government level and the local
government level (counties and municipalities). Important parts of government policy is implemented
by the local government, such as most of health care and education as well as social care. Local
government consumption was some 60 per cent of general government consumption in 1993.
The central government controls the activity level in local government by controlling most of their
revenues. Local right to tax is regulated by a ceiling on local tax rates, and all municipalities apply the
highest local government tax rate permitted. Local government tax rates are thus exogenous to the
local government. The basic instrument for controlling the activity level in local government is
transfers from the central government to local government. In 1993, net transfers constituted 40 per
cent of the local government's revenues. The consequence of this system is that local government
revenues has been to a large extent determined at the state level. The local government is obliged by
the law to have balanced budgets, except for financing of real investment. Still, there seems to be
some room for manoeuvre at the local government level6. One important aspect of this, has been the
tendency for local governments gradually to increase fees for public services. Earlier, these services
were often provided free or at a price well below average costs. Especially in the 1980's fees for these
services were discovered to constitute an independent source of financing for the local government
sector in Norway. Fees were increased significantly and services previously supplied free of charge
were subject to fees. In our study, the increase in fee rates is analysed together with direct household
taxes. The motivation behind this is that private households in practice had very small possibilities for
substituting away from increased fees, so that the fees worked very much like a local government tax.
We now describe the details in the developments in the policy variables. We distinguish 10 sub-
groups of fiscal policy variables. The policy variables are:
1. Central government employment
2. Central government purchases for consumption purposes
3. Central government real investment
4. Local government employment
5. Local government purchases for consumption purposes
6. Local government gross real investment
7. Household tax rates (incl. local government fee rates)
8. Payroll tax rates and VAT rates
9. Taxes and subsidies levied on products and industries
10. Transfers to households
As part of the description of the data, we report cross-correlations between the deviations from trend
in the various policy variables and the deviation from trend in private GDP mainland. These are
shown in table 1.
                                                     
6
 For an analysis of local government behaviour in Norway, see Langørgen (1994).
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Table 1. Contemporaneous correlations of per cent deviations from trend for GDP mainland
and various policy instruments. λ = 100000
Variable                                                                                                  1973-82          1983-93          1973-93
Purchases, centr. gov. civilian 0.11 -0.43 -0.34
Purchases, military -0.03 0.10 0.05
Purchases, local government 0.07 0.03 0.04
Employment, centr. gov. civilian -0.11 -0.17 -0.11
Employment, military -0.19 -0.37 -0.35
Employment, local government -0.02 0.25 0.17
Average payroll tax rate -0.15 -0.52 -0.28
Average personal tax rate (incl. fees) 0.05 0.21 0.18
Real investment, central gov. 0.20 -0.33 -0.25
Real investment, local gov.                                                                            0.22                 0.07                 0.13
From the simple correlations in table 1 civilian central government employment appears
countercyclical, while the opposite is the case for local government employment. Differences in
correlations between central and local government was also seen for real investment. The strongest
partial correlations between per cent deviations from trend was present for personal taxes, which
appeared strongly countercyclical, especially in the second sub-period. Local government real
investment was procyclical while there was a mixed picture was present for central government real
investment. The correlation with the cycle will has varied over time, and this can be seen from visual
inspection of the series. More details are given below.
4.1. Government consumption (employment and purchases)
Government consumption consists of central and local government employment, purchases of goods
and services and depreciation. Depreciation depends on previous real investment. The composition of
government consumption regarding employment and direct purchases has changed somewhat
throughout the period. In 1973 wage costs in the government sectors constituted 68 per cent of
government consumption, while this share had increased to 72 per cent in 1993. This is due to
different trends in employment in man-hours and purchases in constant prices. As we construct
separate trends for each variable, the changing long run composition of government consumption is
not defined as a part of policy. However, short run composition effects may still be present. We
distinguish three kinds of government employment: Military (including conscripts), central
government civilian employment and local government employment. For consumption purchases the
same distinction is present7. Trends and smooth trajectories for government employment are shown in
figure 4. Figures 5 and 6 show per cent deviations from trend. More details are found in appendix 2.
                                                     
7
 A minor exception is that large imported military purchases (submarines, airplanes etc.) are separated out from other
military purchases.
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Figure 5.  Public employment, man-hours
General government
Central government
Local goverment
Starting below trend in 1973, general government
employment was above trend the whole period
from 1976 to 1984. The maximum positive devia-
tion from trend was in 1981, and from then on
government employment started to approach the
trend from above, under the less public sector-
friendly conservative government. Further
restraints in government employment changes took
place in the booming years in the mid 1980s and
afterwards. We also see that increases in govern-
ment employment played a part in the fiscal expan-
sion from 1989 on, where government employment
approaches the trend from below and stays above trend in 1992 and 1993. There are some differences
regarding local and central government employment. From table 1 we see that central government
employment is countercyclical in both sub-periods. Local government was countercyclical during
1973-82, but seemed procyclical in the period 1983-93. Central government employment was
significantly above trend in the recession years 1981-83 and after 1990. This seems like a strong use
of central government employment in recessions. Parts of the specific temporary labour market
programmes enacted in these periods were included in the central government employment variables.
However, parts of these programs were registered as purchases as well, since parts of the training
programs were run by private firms. Consequently we can not analyse directly the effects of labour
market programmes.
Contrary to central government employment, local government employment remained above trend in
the booming years 1984 and 1985. Also, it seems that local government employment continued to
decline relative to trend in the recession years of 1988 and 1989, when unemployment started to rise,
leading to the procyclical fluctuations in this variable.
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The pattern for general government consumption purchases deviates somewhat from the pattern for
general government employment. It seems that it is easier to change consumption purchases than
government employment; the deviations from trend are much larger for purchases than for employ-
ment. While general government employment was above trend from 1976 to 1984, general govern-
ment consumption purchases were below trend in the period 1979-1984, and above trend in the
booming years 1985-87. This pattern is mainly due to the variations in central government purchases
relative to trend, whereas the deviations from trend in local government purchases were smaller.
According to table 1, local purchases and military purchases were acyclical or slightly procyclical,
while central government purchases were countercyclical in the second sub-period. The sharp increase in
central government purchases from 1989, is probably the single most important factor behind this. It is
also of interest to note that both local government purchases and employment continued to decline
relative to trend in 1989 and 1990, when the increase in unemployment was very apparent. The fiscal
expansion of these years took place in central government employment and purchases.
4.2. Government investment
General government gross real investment has historically shown more variability than employment
and consumption purchases, but is of a smaller magnitude than government consumption. Government
investment declined as a share of GDP mainland from 5.2 per cent in 1973 to 4.4 per cent in 1992. The
trend and actual development in gross public investment are shown in figure 7 while deviations from
trend are displayed in figure 8.
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General government investment were particularly high in 1978, 1988/89 and 1991/92, whereas parti-
cularly low from 1982 to 1985. In 1978, the peak was apparent both for central and local government
investment, and of equal relative magnitude. Declining government real investment in the years 1979-
1982 took place both at the local and central level, and investment both at the central and local level
remained low until 1985. The rapid increase in general government investment from 1985 to 1988, was
largely due to the development in the local government while central government continued below
trend. This may seems to be another example of procyclicality of local government demand, since this
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is the period of the largest boom in post-war Norway. From 1988 central government investment
started to increase and was far above trend in 1991 and 1992, leading to an interpretation of counter-
cyclical movements in this variable. Local government investment had an entirely different path:
After the peak in 1988, it quickly returned to trend in 1990 and remained slightly below trend
thereafter, again showing a procyclical pattern.
4.3. Household taxes
Direct taxes as a fraction of household taxable income have shown large variations during 1973-1993.
For wage-earners, taxes have tended to increase significantly, whereas the opposite seems to be the case
for pensioners. For self-employed, no long run tendency seems present, cf. appendix 3. Local govern-
ment fees have increased significantly over the period, and if these fees are accounted for as equivalent to
direct taxes (cf. below), the average household tax rate including local government fees in figure 9 emerges.
The model of course does not include the full details of the tax system. Our analysis is based on
analysing effects on deviations from trends in observed average tax rates for the three socio-economic
groups. We have not accounted for automatic increases in average tax rates in years when income growth
became stronger than expected and moved taxpayers into higher income tax brackets than was expected
when tax rules were decided on. In reality, different taxes are to some extent calculated with different tax
bases, which we only to a limited degree can account for. From year to year, relatively minor changes
in the taxation of firms have been done, in addition to the major tax reform in 1992. In our analysis, we
have only considered effects of changes in personal taxation, which by far have been the most important.
There have been relatively long periods of declines and rises in the average tax rate. The summary
correlation coefficients in table 1 indicate a significant countercyclical use of personal taxes in both
sub-periods. From 1973 to 1977, average household taxes plus local government fees as a share of
taxable income, was reduced from some above 29 per cent to 27 per cent. The austerity programme
after the breakdown of the countercyclical "bridging policy" 1975-1977, implied a sharp tax increase,
which halted in 1980. The newly elected conservative government residing from late 1981, had a change
from direct to indirect taxation as an important policy goal. This policy involved reductions in direct
taxes. However, a significant direct tax reduction was enacted already by the labour government in the
1981 budget. Tax reductions were implemented all years until 1984, although of a magnitude less than
the first reduction in 1981. The tax reductions were accompanied by lower growth rates than in earlier
years in government consumption, cf. above. As the boom in the domestic economy became apparent
from 1985, small tax increases were enacted, but taxes were not much increased in the early stages of
this cyclical upturn. The increasing average tax rates were also a result of higher-than expected growth
in private incomes. It was only in 1986, after the world market oil prices had fallen, that domestic house-
hold taxes were really increased. Personal tax rates were reduced again when rising unemployment
became evident, in 1989, and tax reductions were implemented until 1992. From 1992, a tax reform
was legislated, intending to increase neutrality in taxation of different sources of income (capital
income, labour income, operating surplus etc.). In addition to changing the relative tax rates of various
assets and income types, the tax reform in 1992 also implied a reduction of average personal taxes,
which is reflected in figure 9.
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Local government fees in per cent of household
taxable income rose from 1.5 per cent in 1973 to
4.5 per cent in 1993. As most of the services
delivered for the fees were of a kind that was not
easily substitutable for households, the increase in
local government fees had more or less the same
effect on household real disposable income as an
increase in income taxes. However, the immediate
price effects were different since higher fees
increased the consumer price index whereas higher
income taxes only affect consumer prices by
shifting of taxes onto wages that will later on result
in higher prices, according to the model. The increases in fees took place over the whole period 1973-
93, but were particularly strong in the years 1988 to 1991, a period of austere fiscal policy in Norway.
However, most of the increases in fees were captured by the trend and it was only in the years 1988-
91 where there were significant differences between actual and trend fee rate. In 1991 the difference
amounted to nearly 0.5 per cent-points of household taxable income. An interpretation of the
development in 1988-91 is that the local government sector reacted to reduced transfers from the
central government by an extraordinary increase of fees, thereby reducing the negative effects on their
revenues. This took place at the expense of the private sector, who experienced an erosion of their
purchasing power as a consequence of increased fees. Detailed figures for tax rates are shown in
appendix 3.
4.4. Payroll taxes and value added tax
The introduction of the Norwegian national insurance system in 1967 was followed by a sharp
increase in payroll tax rates until 1972. Until 1993, the only changes had been a reduction of the
payroll tax rate in 1975 as a part of the government's participation in the nation-wide income
settlements at that time, and some reductions of the payroll tax rate in certain regions as a part of
regional policy. This reduced the average payroll tax rate somewhat. In 1993, the average payroll tax
rate was reduced simultaneously with a general VAT increase as a part of what has been called an
"internal devaluation". The intention was probably to reduce labour costs for the firms, while hoping
that increased profitability and increased consumer prices would not increase wage claims
proportionately. We have defined the trend for the payroll tax rate by the HP filter from 1973 to 1992.
The trend value for 1993 is defined as the same as the 1992 value. This is because the actual change
in 1993 was very large compared to all previous changes. Consequently, the whole reduction in
payroll taxes in 1993 is defined as a policy shock. The VAT rate was unchanged at 20 per cent from
1973 to 1992 and increased to 22 per cent from then on. For the same reason as for payroll tax, we
define smooth policy as 20 per cent VAT for the whole period. The calculated net effect of the
combined policy of deviation from trend in VAT and payroll taxes are shown in appendix 4. The tax
increase was positive during 1973-76 and slightly negative during 1982-1986, where some increases
in the average payroll tax were enacted. The "internal devaluation" was on average contractionary by
about 1 billion 1991-kroner in 1993.
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4.5. Other indirect taxes and subsidies
Indirect taxes have played a significant role in financing the government sector in Norway. Various
excise taxes (cars, alcohol, tobacco, fossil fuels, electricity and some other items) constituted 8 per
cent of mainland GDP in 1993. In 1973 these figures were approximately the same. At the same time
subsidies have been a relative large component on the expenditure side of the budget. Subsidies
constituted 5.8 per cent of mainland GDP in 1973, increasing to 8.6 per cent in 1976. By 1993 sub-
sidies had declined relatively to 7.6 per cent of mainland GDP. Industrial assistance to certain sectors
has been and still is prevalent. Agriculture and food-processing manufacturing industry have been
large recipients of such budgetary support. These subsidies have been a cornerstone in regional policy
in Norway. From the mid 1970's, industrial assistance especially to ship-building (an activity that in
Norway to a large extent has been transformed to oil platform-building) increased significantly. The
support levels have only marginally been reduced during the 1980s. The state banks have provided
loans to housing and education, at below market rates. As the interest rate differential increased
during the 1980s, this resulted in increased government outlays to finance the state banks, and these
outlays appeared as subsidies to the banking sector.
An appropriate analysis of important parts of government subsidies would probably require other
tools than a macroeconomic model, since the subsidies often are given on certain conditions, not
specified in the model. The subsidies also are given as a part of a more comprehensive policy pack-
age. Agricultural policy is a good example. During the 1970s agriculture policy was changed with the
specific aim to raise the farmers' incomes to the average for industrial workers. This was attempted by
changes in regulations and a massive increase in subsidies. The effects on production, employment,
investment and incomes in agriculture were probably large, but a macroeconomic model where
agricultural production and productivity are exogenous is hardly a good tool to analyse the effects. In
order not to let assumptions on the effects on agricultural production and productivity that some might
find arbitrary, affect the results, we have excluded these subsidies altogether from the analysis.
We have made similar considerations regarding the effects of subsidies to maintain low interest rates
in state banks. The rising interest rate differential between market interest rates and interest rates in
the state banks required increased subsidies. Although an alternative to the actual development might
have been to raise interest rates in state banks with corresponding smaller increases in subsidies to the
banking sector, we have chosen to exclude this area of policy from the analysis as well. This is partly
motivated by the view that this may as well be seen as a part of monetary policy as a part of fiscal
policy.
Some other indirect taxes and subsidies have also been excluded8. Our choice, which must be borne in
mind when evaluating the results, was to include the following excise taxes: Taxes on electricity,
gasoline and heating oils and on alcoholic beverages9. Furthermore we include deviations from trend
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 The most important were specific food subsidies that were given in the 1970s in order to limit wage increases in the central
wage settlements, which we interpret as a part of income policy. Also oil taxes, which probably has had no noticeable direct
effect on behaviour in the private sector in the mainland economy, are excluded.
9
 These taxes are treated separately, because they are collected in the wholesale and retail trade sector according to the
national accounts.
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in the general investment tax and net sectoral taxes (taxes minus subsidies) to some sectors in the
model used10. The average net tax revenues from these taxes and subsidies are shown in figures 10
and 11.
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A picture of reduced net indirect taxes through the 1970s and rising net indirect taxes during the
1980s emerges. Net indirect taxes in per cent of GDP mainland private sector were particularly high
in 1986-1988. The increased taxes from 1984 to 1987-88 arises partly through the gradual abolition of
food subsidies introduced as a part of the income settlements of the 1970s. More important were
increases in fuel taxes which played an important role in the fiscal contraction in 1986 and 1987.
From 1973 to 1975 and from 1985 to 1992, net indirect taxes were above trend. It is important to note
that the trends are defined at a disaggregated level, where indirect tax rates have been subject to de-
trending by the HP filter. The detailed data are shown in appendix 4.
A U-shaped picture of net indirect taxes as a share of GDP mainland during 1973-93 appears. It is the
subsidy policy that is the main factor behind this. Large increases in subsidies to domestic transport
and private services were also present in this decade, which helped reduce net taxes. In the 1970s, a
number of excise taxes were not annually indexed to higher domestic prices, leading to lower real
value of the tax. The fiscal contraction after the abandoning of the bridging policy marks the end of
this regime. In the 1980s, both the labour and the conservative governments wanted to reduce
subsidies and also started a policy of reductions in direct taxes and increases in indirect taxes. From
the mid 1980s, the wish to increase fuel taxes as a part of environmental policy coincided with the
need for fiscal contraction after OPEC III, thus prolonging the regime of increasing net indirect taxes.
As the whole period can be said to consist of two policy regimes - one with declining net indirect
taxes and one with increasing net indirect taxes - the definition of trends becomes especially difficult,
which can be seen e.g. for net sectoral taxes in the consumption goods industry (cf. figure 3 in
appendix 4). Our defined trend with a λ-value of 100 000, implies a strong negative tax impulse from
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 We include net sectoral taxes for the following sectors: Production of consumption goods, Petroleum refineries,
Production of ships and oil platforms, Domestic transport and Production of miscellaneous services.
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1975 to 1981, while the impulses from 1981 were modest, though positive on average. Before 1975,
the tax impulse was positive. Net indirect taxes above trend was present in 1987 and 1988, but net
taxes were reduced again in 1989. A less smooth trend (e.g. with λ = 16000), would have made the
trend follow the U-shape of the series more closely, and have implied smaller policy impulses. But
then the policy change from the late 1970s to the 1980s would have disappeared from our analysis.
This is strongly counter-intuitive.
4.6. Transfers
Transfers to the household sector constituted some 15 per cent of GDP in 1973, rising to 26 per cent
of GDP in 1992. However, the policy decisions for transfers do not concern the actual payments
directly, but the laws and rules for granting benefit under the various transfer and pension systems.
Annual parliamentary decisions regarding indexation are also important. Some transfers (especially
unemployment benefit) are closely linked to the labour market situation. Unemployment benefits are
endogenous in our analysis, determined by unemployment and the average hourly wage11.
The most important transfers are retirement pension and disability benefits. In 1993 these benefits
constituted 41 per cent of total transfers to households. We look upon retirement pension payments as
driven by the number of elderly (the retirement age in the National Insurance system was reduced to
67 years in 1973 and has been unchanged since then) and annual budget decisions in Parliament of
adjustments of current per capita pensions (the so-called Basic Pension Unit (BPU) and Minimum
Pension (MP)). Similar effects are present in the system of disability benefits, although the inflow to
this benefit is found also to some extent to depend on the labour market situation (Bowitz (1992)).
However, to simplify the analysis, we consider the number of disability benefit recipients as
exogenous.
We utilize average pensions per recipient in constant prices for retirement pension and disability
benefit, respectively, as indicators for changes in policy for these variables. For these variables trends
and actual values are shown in appendix 5. Calculating deviations from trend in these variables, we
can isolate shocks to transfer payments due to demographic changes (number of retirees) from
changes due to changes in real per capita pensions. Changes in per capita pensions may occur both
due to annual decisions on BPU and MP as well as changes in pension rights through the automatic
working of the rules in the National insurance system, and we lump these factors together. The rest of
transfers (exc. health transfers) are treated as one aggregate. These transfers include confinement
benefit, family allowance, social care assistance, rehabilitation benefit and some other smaller
components. We can identify some shocks to this variable, from 1979 to 1980 and in the late 1980s,
cf. figure 3 in appendix 5. From 1979 to 1980 family allowance was significantly increased, while
confinement benefit per birth was rapidly increased since the mid 1980s. The deviations from trend in
total transfers exc. unemployment benefit are shown in figure 12.
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 From 1979, unemployment benefit was subject to income taxation, while this was not earlier the case. To compensate the
recipients, the per capita benefit was increased accordingly. Neither effects are considered parts of fiscal policy.
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For both retirement pensions, disability benefit and
the rest of transfers, the late 1970s saw a sharsp
increase. This partly was due to large increases in
minimum pensions. In later years, deviations from
trend have been smaller. The late 1980s and early
1990s saw above trend transfers especially for
transfers other than retirement pension and disa-
bility benefit. One might argue that this might
partly be attributed to effects of the rising unem-
ployment, which exerts a pressure on benefits such
as rehabilitation benefit and social assistance (note
that unemployment benefit is not included in the
figures for transfers). However, we treat this as
deviations from smooth policy.
5. Main properties of the KVARTS model
The KVARTS model of Statistics Norway is in many respects a fairly traditional macroeconometric
model. However, it is disaggregated by international standards (18 sectors and 25 commodities). It
also specifies a disaggregated array of policy instruments. A description of the model and its
properties as well a documentation of historical tracking performance is given in Hove and Eika
(1994).
The model is heavily based on the national accounts and is built around an input-output core which
describes the commodity flows. Consumer demand is determined in a macro consumption function,
where current income and wealth are the main explanatory variables. Wealth consists of total
financial wealth and the value of the housing stock. The price of the housing stock is negatively
related to the real interest rate. The deregulation of financial markets in 1984 is captured by dummy
variables. This affect the equations for private consumption and housing investment, that become
more wealth-sensitive and less income-sensitive after deregulation. The equation for housing prices
becomes more interest rate-sensitive after deregulation.
Interest rate effects are also present in the model via the value of housing in the consumption function
and directly in the housing investment function. Real investment in the production sectors depend on
production and profitability in each sector. No significant direct effects from changes in user costs of
capital have been detected, except in the housing investment equation.
Production behaviour is based on monopolistic competition. Firms sell their goods both on the
domestic and foreign markets. Price mark-ups over unit variable costs depend on changes in capacity
utilisation and competitors' prices. Short-run demand for labour and intermediate inputs are based on
cost-minimisation for a given level of production and capital stock, and depend on relative factor
prices, real capital stock and trends. On average, the production functions exhibit increasing to scale
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in all production factors. The average scale elasticity in the sectors where there are estimated factor
demand functions is approximately 1.2.
Import prices and the exchange rate are exogenous in the model. In most of the period Norway pegged
its currency to a basket of foreign currencies reflecting Norway's foreign trade. The domestic short
run money market rate is assumed to be obey Uncovered Purchasing Power Parity in the long run. In
the short run deviations due to adjustment lags are present. Also, increased surpluses on the current
account exert a downward pressure on Norwegian interest rates, proxying expectations of exchange
rate changes.
Both domestic and export prices of Norwegian goods and services are heavily influenced of
production costs. Market shares on the domestic and export market are negatively related to the
relative price between Norwegian and foreign goods.
Unit labour costs depend on import prices in domestic currency, wages and productivity, as well as
indirect taxes and subsidies. Wages are determined by wage equations based on a bargaining model.
Wages depend positively on consumer and producer prices with equal weights. Productivity has a unit
long run elasticity, and payroll and indirect taxes (VAT and excise taxes) are passed through onto
wages with the same weights as the producer price and consumer price index, respectively. Pass-
through of direct household taxes on wages is also present in the model, as well as a separate effect of
progressivity in the income tax system (increased progressivity implies lower wages, cet. par), along
the lines in e.g. Lockwood and Manning (1992). Increased unemployment lowers wages, and the
relationship is found to be highly non-linear. Consequently, at high levels of unemployment (5 per
cent as in the early 1990s), changes in unemployment have little effect on wages. At low levels (less
than 2 per cent) such as during most of the 1970s, the effects are strong.
The GDP multiplier of increased government demand is around 1.0 after 4 quarters rising to 1.2 after
8 quarters. Real wages increase much more in the case of low initial unemployment than in the case of
high unemployment, but the GDP multipliers do not differ much in the two cases. However,
competitiveness and the surplus on the current account is much more reduced by a fiscal expansion
when unemployment initially is low than when unemployment is high.
6. Effects of deviations from smooth policy
This section shows the main effects of the policy shocks described above. An overall picture
regarding the cyclical effects of fiscal policy is given in table 2, which shows mean absolute
percentage deviation and mean absolute deviation (MAPD/MAD) under smooth policy and under
actual policy. The main impression for most variables is that MAPD from trend for macroeconomic
quantity variables were smaller under actual policy than under smooth policy, although this was not
uniformly the case. However, the magnitude of the reduction of MAPD under actual policy compared
to smooth policy is relatively modest. For example, MAPD for GDP mainland was reduced by almost
0.2 per cent-points- from 2.27 per cent to 2.09 per cent for the whole period, a reduction of average
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volatility of 8 per cent. The reduction in MAPD appeared mainly in the first sub-period, while the
reduction in the latter was much smaller. Surprisingly, MAD for the unemployment rate was higher
under actual policy than under smooth policy, for the period 1973-1993 seen as a whole. More details
regarding cyclical effects of policy in different periods, can be obtained by actual inspection of the
series, under actual and smooth policy.
Figures 13-15 show GDP mainland, the unem
ployment rate and the current account under
smooth and actual policy and the effect of
actual policy. Note that in fig. 13 the deviation
from trend is displayed while figures 14 and 15
show the variables themselves.
With smooth policy, the cyclical upturn in
GDP mainland in 1973/74 would have been
much larger (the peak would have been more
than 4 per cent above trend while the actual
peak was 2 per cent above trend). In the
bridging policy years 1975-77, the aim of
policy was to counteract falling foreign demand by expanding domestic demand. The effect of policy
measured as the difference between actual and simulated GDP mainland with smooth policy, moved
from below -2 per cent to 2 per cent from 1974 to 1977. Still, we can register a cyclical trough
(though above the trend here). The peak of the policy effect is at the trough - a clearly countercyclical
effect. The policy effect on GDP mainland is positive a long period, although to a declining extent.
Policy had a positive effect on this variable until 1985. The contribution from actual policy to GDP
mainland was approximately constant at 1 per cent from 1979 to 1983. In 1981-1983, the Norwegian
economy was in a recession. GDP mainland fell below trend and unemployment, which had been
below 2 per cent in the 1970s, rose to above 3 per cent. Falling foreign demand in the aftermath of the
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OPEC II oil prise rise was one important factor behind the recession. According to our analysis, the
effects of fiscal policy were approximately the same as in the previous years, or slightly less positive.
The domestically driven (financial deregulation and large petroleum investments, cf. Cappelen and
Eika (1996)) upturn from 1984 to 1986, took place with only modest changes in the effects of fiscal
policy. On level form, smooth policy and actual policy produced exactly the same deviation from
trend in 1985. It was first in 1986, after the oil price collapse that fiscal policy was tightened. Policy
was tightened further in 1987 and 1988. Actual policy raised GDP mainland by approximately 1/2 per
cent in 1984, while it reduced this variable by the same magnitude in 1986.
Under the actual policy from 1986, the peak in the deviation from trend for GDP mainland was in
1986Q1 while the peak would first have occurred in 1987Q4 under smooth policy. Thus, the fiscal
contraction in 1986 was clearly countercyclical. The effect on GDP mainland was approximately 1
per cent in 1987 and nearly 2 per cent in 1988. However, by 1988, GDP mainland had plummeted and
was far below trend. Unemployment lagged somewhat in the cycle, but it was evident that
unemployment was rising beyond numbers experienced since World War II in Norway. Still, the
effect of fiscal policy in 1989 were only slightly less negative than in 1988. When the unemployment
effects were visible, the government enacted a fiscal expansion from 1989Q2 with higher growth in
government consumption and investment as well as lower taxes. However, as can be seen from the
figures of policy parameters, government employment was still below trend, and this lasted until
1992. The negative impact from actual policy on the level of GDP mainland sector continued until
1992, but with a continuously smaller amount. In these years the Ministry of Finance budget indicator
showed a large fiscal expansion. This indicator measures the change in the cyclically corrected budget
balance, compared to the previous year. Our analysis gives a very similar result; the change from the
previous year in the effect of deviation from trend in fiscal policy, was positive in from 1989 to 1993.
The unemployment rate is shown in figure 14. The policy effects on unemployment resemble very
much the effects on GDP mainland, cf. above. The years 1973 and 1974 were characterized by high
pressure in the labour market and actual policy increased unemployment by approximately 0.3 per
cent-points in 1973. Unemployment started to rise in 1975, and unemployment under actual policy
equalled unemployment under smooth policy in this period. Fiscal policy lowered unemployment
during 1978-81, when the first period of rising unemployment in the 1980s started. But while fiscal
policy had a positive effect on GDP mainland from 1981 to 1985, the simulated effects on
unemployment were actually positive! This was due to negative employment effects in the simulation
with actual policy. What happened was that actual policy increased labour productivity, and despite
positive effects on output, higher productivity resulted in lower employment and higher
unemployment. The reason why this result emerges is that since actual policy lowered unemployment
during 1978-80, wages (both nominal and real wages) in this and the following years were higher than
what would have been the case under the smooth policy. This initiated higher private consumption
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and real investment which via the effects on the real capital stock, raised value added per man-hour in
the private sector. The net result was an increase in value added per man-hour in the medium run12.
During the booming years 1985 and 1986, unemployment effects of fiscal policy were modest but
positive. This was a desired outcome both since unemployment was very low and the current account
had to be improved. The change in policy from 1986 on had very similar effects on the unemployment
rate as on GDP mainland. However, the unemployment-increasing effects of fiscal policy were clearly
higher during 1988-90 than in 1986 and 1987. This may be due to the stronger contractionary fiscal
stance but also lagged effects of the policy contraction in 1986/87. It is of interest to note that policy
seemed procyclical in 1988 as it contributed to increasing unemployment at the same time as
unemployment started to rise. The very expansionary policy from 1989 described above, reversed the
positive level effects of policy on unemployment. At the end of our analysis period, unemployment
was about 0.5 per cent-points below the level under smooth policy.
One of the important motives for changes in fiscal policy has been to stabilize the current account.
The current account under the two fiscal policies and the effect of deviations from smooth policy are
shown in figure 15. Positive effects of policy on the current account were apparent where the effects
on domestic demand and production were negative. The worsening current account balance during
1973-77 was initially not regarded as critical because everyone in Norway expected large future
petroleum revenues. Significant parts of the current account deficits were also a consequence of
imports of investment goods to increase the capital stock in the petroleum sector. But finally the
deficits were considered too large and policy was directed at restoring the external balance. We see,
however, that fiscal policy only contributed marginally to the improvement of the current account
balance from 1978 to 1981. The currency devaluation and later wage and price controls may have
been important, but the rising petroleum prices from OPEC II and higher petroleum production were
the most important factors behind the improvement in the current account. From 1977 to 1980,
petroleum exports as a share of GDP rose from 4 per cent to 14 per cent. The policy effect of the
current account/GDP ratio changed from -2 per cent to 0 from late 1977 to 1980, while the actual
development of this ratio was from -20 per cent to + 4 per cent.
The current account showed comfortable surpluses during the first part of the 1980s. Rising petroleum
revenues prevented the domestic boom to bring the current account into deficit during 1984-85. The
sudden worsening of the current account in 1986 as a consequence of OPEC III undermined the
credibility of the currency. But still we see that the partial effects on the current account of the fiscal
policy measures were small, though clearly present in 1987-89. The sources behind the actual
improvement of the current account must be sought elsewhere, such as the currency devaluation, and
income policy through legislation of wage increases. And the self-regulating mechanisms of the
economy were probably also important. Later, increases in the volumes of petroleum production were
the main factors behind the increase in the current account surplus from 1989 on. The policy
                                                     
12
 The factor demand equations are documented in Bowitz and Cappelen (1994).
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expansion from 1989 on to curb rising unemployment meant a halt to the positive contribution from
fiscal policy to the current account/GDP ratio.
The main effects of policy on domestic prices came through indirect taxes and subsidies, and of
factors influencing the prices of production factors in the economy. Wage formation is crucial in
analysing the wage and price effects of fiscal policy. In the KVARTS model both product prices and
consumer prices influence the actual outcome of the wage bargain. As wage-earners are interested in
the purchasing power of their wages, both consumer prices and direct income taxes are important.
Thus an increase in direct taxes as well as an increase in indirect taxes such as VAT or fuel taxes that
increase consumer prices, will increase the wage level. According to the model, lower unemployment
corresponds to a higher wage level in the long run. In an interval, wage increases will be higher, but in
the long run, the wage level will settle at the higher level. The wage-unemployment locus is according
to the model highly non-linear, implying large wage effects of changes in unemployment at low initial
levels of unemployment and small effects at unemployment levels above 4 per cent. Figure 16 shows
the effects on the consumer price index and on four quarters inflation from the deviations from
smooth policy.
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Figure 17. Effects of actual policy. Macroeconomic variables
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The major changes in the price level between actual and smooth policy can be traced back to the
impulses from net indirect taxes. The peak of the effect on consumer prices during 1973 was some 1
per cent. However, during the 1970s, subsidies increased significantly and several excise taxes were
not indexed fully, thus shifting the positive consumer price effect to a negative effect in 1978. From
the late 1970s and especially in the 1980s, net indirect taxes were reduced, but this has to a large
amount been included in the trends. Not until 1984-88, indirect taxes started to rise, and this was the
main factor behind the simulated positive effect from actual policy. The declining impulse from
indirect taxes after 1988 reduced this cost-push effect. The rapid policy effect of higher consumer
prices in 1993 was almost solely due to the increase in VAT. Although the VAT increase was
accompanied by a significant reduction in payroll taxes, the net effect was a significant increase in
consumer prices. This was probably due to the model property that increases in VAT are assumed to
be passed fully through into consumer prices in the short run, while the price reductions as a
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Figure 16. Consumer price index and four quarters inflation
Consumer price index
Four quarters inflation
29
consequence of lower payroll taxes take time to work through. The effects on inflation, which is
defined as the per cent increase in consumer prices over four quarters, were less permanent.
Effects on some demand components are shown in figure 17. The effects of policy on domestic
demand (in per cent) were stronger than the GDP effects, because some of the changes in demand
partially resulted in changes in imports. Imports were mainly affected through the effects on domestic
demand. Effects on private consumption resemble the effects on GDP mainland, although larger in
magnitude. The initial negative effects from 1973 to 1977 were present, as were the positive effect in
the early 1980s. One difference was that the positive effect of policy was strengthened from 1982 on,
unlike the case for GDP mainland. In this period, the international recession hit Norwegian exports,
which also negatively affected real investment in the private sector. The stimulus from policy to
private consumption increased in this period, although the net effect from fiscal policy to GDP
mainland private sector increased only little. One reason was that the stimulus of the domestic
economy had a - though small - negative effect on exports from the mainland economy via crowding
out due to cost increases.
Table 2. Mean Absolute Percentage Deviation1) (MAPD) in the historical data and simulated
with smooth fiscal policy for all fiscal policy variables changed simultaneously. Per cent
Variable:                                                                    1973-1982                    1 983-1993                   1 973-1993
                                                                                A              S                     A              S                  A              S
GDP 1.49 1.06 2.44 2.39 1.97 1.74
GDP mainland 0.82 1.14 3.29 3.34 2.09 2.27
GDP mainland private sector 1.14 1.49 3.92 4.00 2.56 2.77
Private consumption 1.72 1.26 4.07 4.56 2.92 2.95
Real investment private, mainland 3.64 2.84 15.92 16.09 9.93 9.63
Exports mainland 4.44 4.45 2.53 2.50 3.46 3.45
Imports 8.38 8.33 4.28 4.40 6.28 6.31
Employment 1.41 0.82 2.02 2.26 1.72 1.56
Unemployment rate 2) 0.21 0.23 1.00 0.95 0.62 0.60
Consumer prices 4.11 4.02 3.43 3.10 3.77 3.55
Current account/GDP 2) 4.08 3.82 3.62 3.82 3.85 3.82
Government balance/GDP 2)                              1.69         1.32                 1.80         1.91              1.75         1.63
1)
 Average of absolute value of per cent differences from trend (λ = 100 000) in smoothed values of seasonally adjusted series.
2)
 MAD (Mean Absolute Deviation)
Use of fiscal policy measures in the booming and busting years of the 1980s had larger percentage
effects on private consumption than on GDP mainland. The magnitude of the effects on private
mainland investment were even larger. While the negative effect on private consumption reached its
maximum of -3.4 per cent in 1988Q2, the corresponding number for investment was nearly -8 1/2 per
cent in early 1989. We find negative yet small tracks of crowding out from policy on exports from the
mainland economy, caused by the cost-push effects from increased taxation. Increased unemployment
as a consequence of policy moderated the wage increases caused by this, however.
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While cycles in GDP mainland have been dampened as an effect of deviations from smooth policy,
this turns out not to be the case for several other macroeconomic variables. Data for other
macroeconomic variables are shown in table 2. For 1983-1993 seen as a whole, volatility was larger
for all major macroeconomic sub-aggregates under actual policy than under smooth policy (private
consumption, real investments mainland private sector, exports mainland). The reduction in volatility
for GDP mainland have been caused by the increased cyclical movements in the GDP components to
a larger extent were counteracting each other.
In the first sub-period, cycles for private consumption were larger under the actual policy than under
the smooth policy, but the opposite effect was present during 1983-93. Cycles for real investment
mainland private sector were smaller under smooth policy than under actual policy in the first sub-
period, while smaller in the second sub-period. Exports from mainland Norway were slightly more
volatile under actual policy than under smooth policy in both sub-periods. Total employment was
more volatile under actual policy than under smooth policy in the years 1973-82, while some
dampening effects of the actual deviations from trend in fiscal policy variables were present in the
second sub-period. This picture is also reflected in the results for unemployment.
Although it is the composite effect of fiscal policy that is the focus of our interest, it might be of
relevance to study the partial effects of the individual policy instruments. It turned out that the effects
were different both regarding different instruments and regarding time period. The changes in mean
absolute percentage deviation due to deviations from trend in the individual instruments are shown in
table 3.
The single most output-stabilizing instrument during 1973-93 as a whole were household taxes and
central government real investment. Deviations from trend in household taxes reduced mean absolute
percentage error for GDP mainland private sector by almost 0.4 per cent-points in 1973-82, which
implies almost one half the actual MAPD in this period. In the second sub-period, however, taxes
contributed to higher MAPD, thus making the 1973-93 reduction of MAPD more modest. Similarly,
central government real investment appeared procyclical in the first sub-period and strongly
countercyclical in the second. The degree of cyclicality differs over time for other instruments as well.
Tax policy seemed quite countercyclical in the 1970s while not so in the recession of the early 1980s.
It also played a part of the fiscal contraction after 1986 and the policy expansion after 1989. However,
as we measure level effects both in policy variables and GDP, tax rates were still above trend until
1992, and thus taxes appeared to have a negative impact of GDP mainland private sector in the whole
period after 1987. The policy expansion was manifest by reducing the negative deviation from trend
in GDP.
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Table 3. Change of Mean Absolute Percentage Deviation (MAPD) for GDP Mainland by
deviations from trend in policy variables. Per cent-points
Effect of non-smooth trajectory for:                                         1973-1982           1983-1993           1973-1993
1. Central gov't employment -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
2. Central gov't purchases for consumption 0.00 0.00 0.01
3. Central gov't real investment 0.03 -0.18 -0.07
4. Local gov't employment 0.06 0.13 0.09
5. Local gov't purchases for consumption 0.01 0.01 0.02
6. Local gov't real investment 0.12 -0.16 -0.02
7. Household tax rates (incl. fees) -0.38 0.18 -0.09
8. Payroll taxes/VAT changes -0.05 0.02 0.01
9. Other indirect taxes 0.00 0.09 0.07
10. Transfers 0.00 -0.17 -0.08
11. All of above -0.32 0.00 -0.18
Memo:
Central government 1) -0.33 -0.11 -0.21
Local government 2) 0.14 0.03 0.09
Actual development                                                                             0.82                      3.29                      2.09
1)
 Effects of deviations from trend in central government employment, purchases for consumption, real investment, all direct and indirect tax
rates exc. local government fees, and transfers.
2)
 Effects of deviations from trend in local government employment, purchases for consumption, real, investment and local government fees.
Local government employment contributed to increase volatility in overall economic activity in the
private sector in both sub-periods. This was particularly apparent for local government employment in
the second sub-period. The negative deviations from trend in local government demand contributed
negatively to GDP mainland from 1986 to 1992. Reductions in local government expenditures were
clearly a part of the fiscal austerity package after OPEC III and this negative contribution was a
desired development. It is probably correct to say that the development of the government balance
were never considered as critical in stabilisation policy as the current account during 1973-93. The
effects of deviations from smooth policy are displayed in figure 18. Policy reduced the government
surplus during in periods of fiscal expansion and increased the surplus during periods of fiscal
expansion. As can be seen, except perhaps in the early 1970s, the magnitude of the policy effects were
small compared to the actual development of the government balance.
It is also of interest to see what were the separate effects of local government and central government
behaviour. This is also shown in table 3. All effects from transfers and all tax policy except effects of
deviations from trend in local government fees are assumed to be central government policy. It
appears that central government was countercyclical in both sub-periods, while demand from local
government actually was procyclical in the period 1973-1993 as a whole. In the second sub-period
this procyclical effect was weaker. Figures 19 and 20 outline the detailed effects of impulses from
central and local government, respectively. It is useful to compare the effects of policy with figures 1
and 2 which display the historical business cycles.
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Output effects of deviation from trend in local
government were small until 1975, while central
government exerted a significant negative effect
on GDP mainland. In this period, GDP mainland
was above trend. After 1975, effects of both
central and local government were positive,
which means that the countercyclical "bridging
policy" of 1976-77 took place both in central
and local government. The halt in this policy in
1978/79, however, took in its entirety place in
central government. The effects from deviations
from trend in local government variables were
positive and stable in these years.
From 1981 to early 1984, GDP mainland was below trend. This was the first period of high
unemployment in Norway since World War II. Again, it was central government policy that exerted a
positive effect on GDP mainland, again being countercyclical. Especially central government
employment displays a large increase in the early 1980s (can be seen in figure 1 in appendix 2), which
partly reflects the extensive use of specific labour market measures. Local government changed from
exerting a positive effect on GDP mainland until 1981, to having a negative effect from 1982,
prevailing virtually unchanged until 1987. This reflects partly the policy change of the early 1980's,
where growth reductions in government - especially local government - consumption, were offset by
reductions in the tax level which is classified as central government policy.
It is also of interest to register differences in the effects of central and local government in the
aftermath of the peak in 1987. Current account imbalances were the motivation behind the fiscal
contraction. However, again the change in policy was carried out by central government, while the
negative GDP-effects originating from local government demand actually were reduced in absolute
value (although the effects were still negative). Then negative effects from central government were
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quickly eliminated and became positive, while the effects from local government actually became
more negative. Only from 1991 on, the simulated effects from both central and local government
changed in the same direction. The situation of differing tendencies of central and local government
was also apparent during 1988-89, when unemployment was seen to rise sharply. The effects on
unemployment to a large extent mirrored the effects on overall activity, with the exceptions
mentioned in the discussion of effects on unemployment above.
7. Conclusion
We have analysed the effects on the variability of macroeconomic aggregates from the actual use of
fiscal policy instruments in Norway in the period 1973-93, compared to a smooth development of
these instruments. A general conclusion is that on average, deviations from trend in these instruments
have contributed to stabilize overall economic activity in Norway. The resulting reduction in the
variability of GDP mainland, was according to our estimates less than 10 per cent of the actual
variability. For overall activity in the private sector, the stabilizing effect was smaller, which indicates
that variations in the size of the government sector itself has played a role in the overall reduction in
volatility.
Stabilization of output in a small open economy is not the sole purpose of stabilization policy. During
the period 1973-93, changes in fiscal policy have several times been directed at the current account
and international competitiveness, although current account imbalances often have occurred
simultaneously with cyclical booms (such as in 1985/86). Consequently, fiscal policy has appeared
procyclical at some occasions.
Another interesting finding is that most instruments seem to have exerted a partial output-stabilizing
role. Personal taxes seems to have been the most output-stabilizing instrument, although central
government real investment has also been extensively used for this purpose. It is however interesting
to note that the local government sector has been pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical on average
during 1973-93. It is also of interest to notice that according to our analysis, the effects on output and
unemployment may be different than what one would expect. On at least one occasion, fiscal policy
exerted a positive effect on GDP mainland while at the same time affecting unemployment positively
(and employment negatively). The mechanisms in the modelgenerating this effect do not seem very
controversial. The dynamics through earlier effects on unemployment, wage formation and factor
substitution explains this result.
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Appendix 1. Generation of trend. Smoothing of series
All series are quarterly national accounts data. Originally unadjusted data are adjusted sequentially in
3 sub-periods, due to distinct differences in the seasonal pattern in the original series. The periods are
1967Q1-1977Q4, 1977Q4-1985Q4 and from 1986Q1.
The seasonally adjusted series (lower case letters indicate logarithmic transformation) yt can be
represented as the sum of a trend, cycle and a stochastic component:
y c g st t t t= + +
where gt is the trend component, ct is the cyclical component and st is the noise (stochastic)
component.
The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter extracts a stochastic trend that moves smoothly over time and is
uncorrelated with the cycle. The trend values, gt, are found by minimising the following expression:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )min g t t t t t t
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The first element is the squared sum of actual deviations from trend and the second term is pro-
portional to the sum of squared changes in the trend between two periods. The parameter λ indicates
how large weight should be attached to the consideration of having a smooth trend. A small value of λ
indicates that changes in the changes of the trend are not much penalized in the maximization. A small
value of λ implies that the trend to a large extent will follow the actual variations in the data.
Contrary, a large λ implies that changes in the trend value will be penalized hard, and consequently
implies a trend that is closer to a linear trend.
The seasonally adjusted data were compared to the estimated trends. Still, there was present a signifi-
cant amount of noise in these data, and this made inspection of the series difficult. In order to
facilitate a visual impression of the actual deviations from trend, we report in the figures smoothed
values for the actual (seasonally adjusted) series. The smoothed series, zt, is defined as:
( )z y y y y yt t t t t t= + + + +− − + +18
1
4
1
82 1 1 2
This smoothing procedure, which must not be confused with the HP filter, is carried out on the
seasonally adjusted series. The procedure implies that zt is a 5 quarter moving average of yt
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In determining the trend in the HP filter, the data window we utilize, was important for the
determination of the trend, as mentioned in the text.
The national accounts data available for us, go back to 1967Q1. Nationa accounts data for 1994 and
1995 are used, and extrapolated with a model-based simulation to 2010, cf. chapter 2.
The HP filter assures that the average trend value equals the average value of the actual series (in the
logarithmic transformation) over the maximisation period. But since we only analyse the period 1973-
93, average historical value during 1973-93 does not necessarily equal to average value for the trend
in this period. Thus we have adjusted the trend additively by requiring that average value of the trend
1973-93 be equal to average actual value in this period.
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Appendix 2. Detailed data for government employment,
consumption purchases and real investment
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Appendix 3. Detailed data for direct household taxes
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Appendix 4. Detailed data for indirect taxes
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Appendix 5. Detailed data for transfers
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